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THE END OF THE REVOLUTION: MIMETIC THEORY, AXIOLOGICAL 









There are many explanations about why Europe and the Atlantic system as a whole have 
once again slipped into a condition of hostility, rhetorical violence and military 
confrontation.1 By the end of the 1980s all sides were proclaiming a new era of peace and 
reconciliation in Europe, but three decades later the continent is once again divided and 
no sustainable peace order has been established. The cause of the breakdown has been 
sought in the structural properties of the international system and the attempt of the 
hegemonic power to maintain its status.2 Others focus on power transition theories, 
suggesting that the present crisis arises from the global shift in power away from the old 
West to a rising constellation of powers led by China and Russia.3  For Russian area 
specialists, there is a predominant view that ultimately the original Cold War from the 
late 1940s to 1989 was never entirely dismantled and an inclusive and equitable post-
Cold War order was never established.4  
This paper takes a rather different approach, and focuses on the quality of political 
relationships and the nature of contemporary inter-state relations. The fundamental 
question is why the end of the Cold War was not accompanied by a qualitative 
improvement in interactions on the European continent. After all, the end of the Cold 
War represented not just a geopolitical shift but perhaps more importantly a moment of 
UXSWXUH ZKDWKLVWRULFDO LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVWVFDOOD µFULWLFDO MXQFWXUH¶) and opportunity as the 
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200-year period of revolutionary pathos born of the great events of 1789 came to an end. 
Revolution as a mode of political change gave way to an understanding that change in the 
quality of political relationships is no less important than the transformation of 
sociological relations between classes and even power systems. At the end of the Cold 
War there were attempts to put an end not only to the specific aspects of bipolar 
confrontation (a dualism that also structured much of domestic politics in western 
countries) between the capitalist democracies and the Soviet-led socialist bloc, but also to 
FKDOOHQJH WKHYHU\ ORJLFRIµGnostic wars¶.5 Instead of a transformation of international 
politics, as proclaimed by Mikhail Gorbachev and his associates who advanced the New 
Political Thinking, all that took place was a power inversion, accompanied in due course 
by the enlargement of the allegedly triumphant Western system.6 
One form of immanence ± the view that somewhere beyond the realm of 
bourgeois politics and capitalist relations a socialist alternative was recoverable and 
achievable ± gave way to another: that liberal democracy and the market state was the 
only viable political form of modernity. Both sides lost their accustomed enemy, or at 
least the perception of the enemy. The ensuing de-differentiation generated mimetic 
rivalry, a type of hostility that may well be more intractable than traditional ideological 
competition. Ultimately, post-communist liberal triumphalism degraded the quality of 
social relations within states and provoked a revival of contestation in the form of what 
has now come to be known as a new cold war.7 The damaging effects of this renewed 
contestation are no less deleterious, and in many ways even more so, than the original 
Cold War. In the earlier version politics was at least structured according to recognisable 
ideological principles, whereas today it is the quality of confrontation itself that has 
become pre-HPLQHQW7KLVKDVSURYRNHGµUHDOLW\ZDUV¶± in which each side denigrates the 
rationality of the other, accompanied by various forms of mimetic conflict, which will be 
described later in this paper. 
The Cold War was more than a particular form of stalemate between two 
powerful military blocs, but also a distinctive form of ideological contestation in which 
two visions of the future of humanity came into collision. These visions shared a 
common root in the eighteenth century European Enlightenment, with its distinctive 
measure of human progress and development. Both the socialist and liberal utopias 
underwent radical changes, yet the contrasting models of human society and 
modernisation ultimately shaped politics for a good part of the twentieth century. With 
the end of the Cold War the character of political time changed, and nowhere more so 
than in Russia, the legatee of the Soviet experiment and at the same time a civilisation 
that far exceeds the bounds of anything wrought by the communist revolution. The anti-
revolutions of 1989-91 were attended by eager expectations of a new era in European 
politics, where the conflicts of the past would give way to the unification of the continent 
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on the basis of shared values and interests.8 Instead, a new era of contestation was soon 
apparent. This paper seeks to provide a theoretical analysis of the roots and dynamics of 
the current krisis, the term used by the ancient Greeks to denote a time of reflection in the 
life of the community. 
 
From cold peace to a new cold war: a mimetic conflict 
 
What are the sources of the renewed conflict, and what are its dynamics? Why did the 
DQWLFLSDWHGHUDRIUHFRQFLOLDWLRQDQGWKHFUHDWLRQRIDµ(XURSHZKROHDQGIUHH¶JLYHZD\
to another period of intense antagonism? The period between 1989 and 2014 was a type 
RIµFROGSHDFH¶LQZKLFKQRQHRIWKHIXQGDPHQWDOLVVXHVRI(XURSHDQSROLWLFDORUGHUDQG
security were resolved.9 The cold peace ebbed and flowed, marked by alternating periods 
of cooperation and conflict, although the general trend was downwards.10 In the end, this 
\HDUV¶FULVLVJDYHZD\WRa new cold war, in which we now find ourselves embroiled. 
This represents not simply the revival of the original Cold War, although much of the 
institutional and ideological framework was preserved after 1989 and has now sprung 
back into action. As Legvold argues, this is the reproduction RIµD¶UDWKHUWKDQµWKH¶&ROG
War. In my view it is a combination of both: much today is different, with the conflict 
between Russia and the West less focused on ideological confrontation and with more of 
a regional character. Nevertheless, the conflict does have a heavy ideational quotient and 
has global implications. The paradox is that as the main protagonists become more 
similar in systemic terms, the conflicts between them intensified.  
Both Russia and the United States claim to be capitalist democracies, and 
although Russia clearly still has work to do to ensure the consolidation of genuine 
constitutionalism, the two in aspirational terms at least, are of the same regime type (even 
WKRXJK5XVVLD¶VGHPRFUDF\LVTXDOLILHGE\DQ\QXPEHURIDGMHFWLYHV, and the American 
one increasingly as well). There is no great ideological divide between the two, yet 
politically they are perhaps even more divided than in the years of the Cold War. In this 
paper I argue that there is a mimetic process at work, in which conflict is generated by the 
LPSRVLWLRQRIRQH¶VLGHQWLW\RQWKHRWKHU7KLVJHQHUDWHVUHVLVWDQFHHVSHFially since the 
REMHFW RI GHVLUHG FKDQJH LV D SURMHFWLRQ RI RQH¶V RZQ GLVFRPILWXUH Mark Leonard 
GHVFULEHVWKHSDUDGR[µ'XULQJWKH&ROG:DUZKHQgeopolitics was above all a clash of 
ideologies, increasing contact and growing convergence between the two disconnected 
societies fostered détente. But the contemporary era of international interdependence has 
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other words, this is a classic type of mimetic competition in which the object of desire is 
WKHJUHDWSRZHUVWDWXVWKDWLVGHILQHGLQWHUPVRIWKHRWKHUV¶DFKLHYHPHQW Both share the 
same immanence, reducing the distance between them and generating conflict over 
ownership of that immanence. 
One of the most fruitful ways of studying the onset of the new cold war is through 
the analytical prism of 5HQp*LUDUG¶VPLPHWLF WKHRU\. Mimetic theory offers a complex 
but rich approach to the dynamics that drive political behaviour. Derived from an 
anthropological study of societal characteristics, it identifies the scapegoat mechanism of 
ritualised violence as the basis for social order. Mimetic desire for Girard was the source 
of much of the aggression and violence of humanity. The actual object of desire for him 
was less relevant WKDQWKHVDPHREMHFWEHFRPLQJWKHVXEMHFWRIWKHRWKHU¶VGHVLUH$WWKH
same time, mimetic desire can open the way out of oneself towards the appreciation of 
others.12 It is not scarcity or power that generates violence in his view but the desire for 
the desire of others. It is the negative aspect of mimesis, generating the double of oneself, 
that is the focus here, giving rise to the scapegoat mechanism. The urge to violence once 
aroused requires an object who is vulnerable and available, and thus an arbitrary victim, 
to allow the violence in a community to be directed outwards.13 My study makes no 
pretence at undertaking an evaluation of mimetic theory as such, but it is inspired by the 
theory to examine a number of ZKDWFDOOHGEHFDOOHGµVWUXFWXUDWLRQV¶RIthe theory when 
applied in an empirical context. In particular, three applications of mimetic theory help 
frame our thinking about Russian, European and great power relations in our era: mimetic 
politics, adaptive mimesis, and mimetic simulacra.  
Mimetic theory also provides the framework for the second step in this paper, an 
exploration of the tension between axiological and dialogical politics. Axiological 
politics, briefly put (the definition will be developed later), is a form of behaviour that 
tends towards closure and the imposition of monological and ideological solutions on 
politics. This applies even when the issue is identity and status rather than ideological 
competition in the traditional sense. Rather than solutions emerging out of a genuinely 
open-ended politics, the management of political affairs in both the domestic and 
international dimensions becomes axiomatic and depoliticised. Political thinking 
becomes hermetic and self-UHIHUHQWLDO DQG LV XQDEOH WR GLVSOD\ HPSDWK\ WR WKH µRWKHU¶
Axiological practices include a heightened emphasis on conspiracy thinking and the 
decay of diplomacy into guttural axiological reflexes, which denies the political 
VXEMHFWLYLW\RIRWKHUSROLWLFDO DFWRUV7KH VWDQFH RIKHLJKWHQHGDZDUHQHVVRIRQH¶VRZQ
norms denigrates the values and indeed the identity of the other. In other words, mimetic 
violence intensifies axiological processes in which identities become more static and 
assertive, accompanied by hermetic closure and ultimately by the assertion of a monist 
political project ± one in which the answers are assumed to have been found, and where 
history is presumed to have ended. 
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 0DUN /HRQDUG µ:K\ &RQYHUJHQFH %UHHGV &RQIOLFW¶ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 5, 
September-October 2013, p. 125.  
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 Vittorio Galleseµ7KH7ZR6LGHVRI0LPHVLV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Political dialogism is at the opposite end of the spectrum, rejecting the very idea 
of linear politics, whether of left and right, universalistic or particularistic. Political 
dialogism rejects the view that there is an immanent order waiting to be discovered, and 
instead suggests that order is generated by the dialogical process itself. By contrast to the 
axiological mode of politics, dialogical politics is open to the concerns of the other and 
engages in mutually transformative engagement. This draws on the ideas of Mikhail 
Bakhtin to suggest a more agonistic and open-ended set of inter-actions between political 
actors whose subjectivity is recognised and accorded equal status. By engaging in a 
dialogical relationship, the character of both evolves and is ultimately transformed ± as 
are the characters in the Dostoevsky novels analysed by Bakhtin.14 This is a politics that 
is dialogical (transformative) rather than dialectical (relational). It is dynamic rather than 
linear, and is fundamentally anti-eschatological and anti-teleological. It dispenses with 
WKH QRWLRQ RI VRFLHWDO µWUDQVLWLRQ¶ WR WDON LQ WHUPV RI WUDQVFHQGHQFH DQG WUDQVIRUPDtion. 
The idea has been applied fruitfully in international affairs. For example, Richard 
Shapcott explores +HJHO¶V DWWHPSW WR UHFRQFLOH XQLYHUVDOLW\ DQG SDUWLFXODULW\15 The 
µGLDORJLFFRVPRSROLWDQLVP¶DGYDQFHGE\$QGUHZ/LQNODWHU is in the same line. LinklDWHU¶V
work The Transformation of Political Community EXLOGVRQ+DEHUPDV¶VGLVFRXUVHHWKLFVWR
explore the potential to move beyond the state-centred anarchical international system 
described by realists to create post-sovereign communities in which there can be new 
expressions of universality and difference.16 
These are far from abstract debates and ultimately go to the heart of the dilemmas 
in contemporary international politics. At the end of the Cold War Russia hoped to join 
ZKDWLWFDOOVWKHµ+LVWRULF:HVW¶WRFUHDWHDµ*UHDWHU:HVW¶LQZKLFK5XVVLDZRXOGEHDFR-
founder and constituent member, and in whose framework all members would be 
transformed as a new community of partnership and equality would be established.17 
Instead, the existing Atlantic commuQLW\ RU PRUH EURDGO\ µWKH :HVW¶ RIIHUHG 5XVVLD
membership but only as a subaltern element of an enlarging existing enterprise. This did 
QRWVDWLVI\5XVVLD¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIVWDWXVDQGUROHLQWKHZRUOG. Above all, such membership 
came to be seen as entailLQJ 5XVVLD¶V ORVV RI LQGHSHQGHQW SROLWLFDO VXEMHFWLYLW\ DV DQ
independent sovereign actor in international affairs.18 Russia was ready share sovereignty 
in the framework of multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations or the Council of 
Europe, and was ready work within the framework of the liberal international order, but 
                                                 
14
 Mikhail Bakhtin, 3UREOHPVRI'RVWRHYVN\¶V3RHWLFV (Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press, 
1984). 
15
 Richard Shapcott, International Ethics: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge, Polity, 2010). 
16
 Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998). 
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 There are obvious similarities between this model of co-constitutive international relations, 
combining universality and particularity, and recent Chinese thinking. In his report to the 19th 
Chinese Communist Party National Congress on 18 October 2017, President Xi Jinping outlined 
IRXU QHZ FRQFHSWV LQ &KLQHVH IRUHLJQ SROLF\ µD QHZ W\SH RI PDMRU FRXQWU\ UHODWLRQV PDMRU
country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, a global community of common destiny, and a 
new type oI LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV¶ ;LH 7DR µ&KLQHVH )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\ ZLWK ;L -inping 




 A view articulated by Andrei Kokoshin, 5HDO¶Q\LVXYHUHQLWHWYVRYUHPHQQRLPLURSROLWLFKHVNRL
sistemy, 3rd edn (Moscow, Evropa, 2006). 
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was not willing to accept the hegemony of the United States. This gave rise to the quarter 
century of the cold peace between 1989 and 2014, and the precipitated the renewed Cold 




*LUDUG¶V DQWKURSRORJ\ LVEDVHGRQ WKHYLFWLPPHFKDQLVPZKich sustains social order by 
redirecting violence to the scapegoat, and appropriative mimesis, the imitation of the desire 
to possess an object, a characteristic of humans throughout the ages.19 Our desires 
reproduce the desires of others intersubjectively in a mimetic process that both copies and 
learns. In primitive religions sacrifice inures a community from the contagion of violence, 
and in more sophisticated forms Christianity showed the victim as innocent and as an 
individual, opening the way for recognition of human dignity. Constrained violence 
prevents greater violence. This mechanism operates at the societal as well as at 
international level. In both, identity is derived from difference, and thus on some sort of 
antagonism to others. This antagonism does not always assume violent forms, since it can 
be constrained by law (a theme that was emphasised more LQ*LUDUG¶V HDUOLHUZRUNand 
authority, yet it is latent and is always ready to break out in various forms of blood-letting. 
As Paul Dumouchel demoQVWUDWHV VR SRZHUIXOO\ µ,W LV WKURXJK YLROHQFH WKDW WKH VWDWH
protects us from violence. It is through the exercise of superior force that it prevents us 
from tearing one another apart, and that superior force comes from shifting the 
FRPPXQLW\¶VYLROHQFHWRDFFHSWDEOHWDUJHWVWRVDFULILFLDOYLFWLPV¶20  
The victim does not necessarily have to be an individual but may also be an 
outsider group of one type or another; or in modern terms, a state that acts as the lightning 
rod for the tensions in a putative security community. In this study, it is the Atlantic system 
that is torn E\ WHQVLRQV DQG 5XVVLD DSSHDUV DV WKH VFDSHJRDW 7KH µ5XVVLDJDWH¶ VFDQGDO
alleging collusion between presidential candidate Donald J. Trump  and Russia in 2016 and 
5XVVLDQµKDFNLQJ¶of the election, prompted an outburst of collective hysteria that was as 
mystifying as it was intense. An extraordinary one-fifth of all major TV network coverage 
of the Trump administration since the inauguration ZHUH GHYRWHG WR 5XVVLD¶V alleged 
nefarious activities, while only 20 seconds were devoted to the possibly more substantial 




presidential election, and the charge that Russia worked to sow division and thus 
undermine American democracy. The extraordinary intensity of the scandal accompanied 
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 René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, trs., Stephen Bann and 
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by the adoption of a new round of harsh economic sanctions in August 2017 is reminiscent 
of a moment of collective hysteria. The whole episode assumed the characteristics of a 
µZLWFK-KXQW¶ LQ ZKLFK D FRPPXQLW\ is seized by the fear of a dangerous outsider. As 
Arthur Miller illustrates so powerfully in The Crucible, describing the Salem witch trials in 
colonial Massachusetts in the early 1690s, the outburst of collective violence was stoked by 
internal tensions and contradictions. In the case of Russiagate, one can understand the 
desire of the losing party to explain an inexplicable defeat by blaming dark external forces, 
but what is more surprising is the way that great swaths of the US media and the public 
sphere uncritically accepted the narrative.22 This is what really damaged American 
democracy and its civic and public institutions.  
 The extraordinary explosion in mimetic violence needs to be explained. The 
domestic sources of this polarisation are not the concern of this paper, and instead the focus 
is on how Russia came to represent a devious and malevolent enemy, able by a few bold 
strokes to change the course of an American presidential election and to subvert the 
foundations of American democracy. Similar claims were made regarding the Brexit vote 
of 23 June 2016 in the UK. Mimetic politics take at least three different forms, but all share 
a root orientation towards an axiological disposition; that is, towards closing down debate 
and patterns of dialogical interaction. Axiological politics are based on a distinctive 
hermeneutics in which one interlocutor places themselves in a privileged position vis-à-vis 
the other. In both international and internal relations, the autonomous political subjectivity 
of the other is in overt or covert ways denigrated. This can be manifested in many different 
ways, ranging from rhetorical violence and diplomatic exclusion to more subtle attitudes of 
µRWKHULQJ¶DQGµRULHQWDOLVDWLRQ¶ From the perspective of our examination of post-Cold War 
confrontation, mimetic theory can be applied in three forms: the mimetic scapegoat, 
adaptive mimesis, and mimetic simulacra.  
 
The mimetic scapegoat 
 
The first type is the most basic and truest to the insights offered by Girard. Scapegoating 
for him entails separation and ultimately sacralisation. It is a way for a society (or an 
international community) to relieve the accumulated tensions through the ritualised 
application of violence. For Girard, the scapegoating principle is a universal phenomenon, 
although through the ages it has taken many different forms.23 The symbolic allocation of 
responsibility for social ills is ascribed to a particular subject, who is then deprived of the 
most basic of rights, the right to life. In common parlance, a scapegoat is more crudely a 
PHFKDQLVP WR GLUHFW YLROHQFH RXWZDUGV WR ILQG VRPH H[WHUQDO µRWKHU¶ UHVSRQVLEOH IRU
internal contradictions. ,Q*LUDUG¶VFRQFHSWLRQWKHYLROHQFHKDVWREHµIRUJRWWHQ¶DQGWKH
sacrificed object becomes sacred. How this applies in secular societies is not clear, and 
even more so in the international community. Girard offers both a problem and a solution, 
whereas the commonplace definition of the scapegoat simply displaces internal tensions to 
another plane, without a means for their resolution. For our purposes, mimetic violence is 
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cathartic and helps not just to displace anger, but above all to reinforce the bonds of 
community and to preserve existing hierarchies.  
 Christian redemption is offered by Girard as the means of resolving the problem of 
collective violence by individualising and personalising the sacrifice that can lead humanity 
RXWRI LWV FULVLV ,QKLV UHFHQWZRUN *LUDUGKDV DGRSWHGD UDWKHUPRUH µDSRFDO\SWLF¶ WRQH
provoked in part by the evident neglect of the Christian message. The inherent rivalry and 
conflict within human society has deep anthropological roots, in which the mimetic nature 
of human relationships reproduces the values, customs and beliefs of a given order. Politics 
alone cannot resolve this violence but it is tempered by the sacral elements that sublimate 
the violence into religious, mythical and ideological forms. In Battling to the End, Girard 
develops most fully the application of mimetic theory to international affairs. In the book of 
interviews, Girard is less convinced than ever that politics can confront and resolve 
violence, and instead argues that even the struggle against violence only begets greater 
violence.24 This is a powerful description of how the foundations of the post-Cold War 
order themselves generate resentment and violence when applied in the form of axiological 
virtue politics. 
Years before Girard had argued that democracy is the most mimetic regime of all, 
since its essentially egalitarian principle means that every citizen is the model and rival to 
the others.25 )RUPVRIPLPHWLFGHVLUHDUHµLQWHUQDOO\PHGLDWHG¶ZKHUHWKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQ
the subject and model is reduced or entirely removed, as compared to the social and other 
EDUULHUV WR µXQGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ¶ LQPRUH WUDGLWLRQDO societies (notably, the gulf between the 
lord and serf, where neither is the model for the other, and therefore mostly not potential 
rivals).26 This insight can also be applied to international society, where the old status 
hierarchies of the colonial era have been levelled to encompass some 200 states with 
formally equal status. ,Q WKH (XURSHDQ FRQWH[W PDQ\ RI WKH UHFHQWO\ µOLEHUDWHG¶ (DVW
European states are the most YLJRURXVLQGHOHJLWLPLWLQJ5XVVLD¶VVHFXULW\FRQFHUQVDQGLQ
repelling any notion of µVSKHUHVRILQWHUHVW¶LQWKHUHJLRQFor them, America is so far above 
the rest that it cannot function as a mimetic rival, but as the distance with potential rivals 
closes, then mimetic hostility is generated.  
Russia occupies some indeterminate status. Much weaker than the former Soviet 
Union, it is nevertheless not in the same category as the other European states. The original 
version of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003 included Russia as just one 
VWDWHDPRQJ WKRVH LQ WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶VQHLJKERXUKRRG LQ(DVWHUQ(XURSHDQG1RUWK
Africa.27 This represented de-differentiation with a vengeance. The Eastern Partnership 
                                                 
24
 René Girard, Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoît Chantre, tr. Mary Baker (East 
Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 2010). 
25
 René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure (Baltimore, 
MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
26
 Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, p. 4 and passim. For an excellent study of the mimetic 
violence unleashed by the undifferentiation arising from internal mediation, see Joel Hodge, 
µ6DFULILFH LQ WKH 'HPRFUDWLF $JH 5LYDOU\ DQG &ULVLV LQ 5HFHQW $XVWUDOLDQ 3ROLWLFV¶ LQ 6FRWW
Cowdell, Chris Fleming and Joel Hodge (eds), Violence, Desire and the Sacred, Vol. 2, René 
Girard and Sacrifice in Life, Love and Literature (London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), pp. 
31-43. 
27
 µ:LGHU (XURSH ± Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and 
Southern NeigKERXUV¶&RPPXQLFDWLRQ IURP WKH&RPPLVVLRQ WR WKH&RXQFLO DQG WKH(XURSHDQ
Parliament, Brussels, 11 March 2003, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf. 
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launched in April 2008 simply ignored Russia while explicitly challenging its traditional 
relationships with countries in the region, and in the end, not surprisingly, provoked the 
Ukraine crisis from late 2013. Later versions of the ENP have precisely stressed the need 
IRUµGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ¶28 The term is not used in the Giradian sense, but nevertheless indicates 
an understanding that the earlier categorisation generated conflict.  
The standard response to the view that politics cannot resolve societal 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQV LV WR DSSHDO WR µNDWƝFKRQLF¶ RU /HYLDWKDQ SROLWLFDO V\VWHPV DV 7KRPDV
Hobbes and Carl Schmitt had done in their different ways. The NDWƝFKRQ is a Pauline 
concept that has been identified with the Roman Empire, a force holding back chaos.29 In 
essence, the Putinite system is a NDWƝFKRQLF order in which contradictions are not resolved 
through politics but suppressed and technocratically managed through a highly flexible and 
adaptive regime. This Leviathan system is itself in part generated by the unresolved 
contradictions at the international level. In other words, fears generated by mimetic rivalry 
at the level of geopolitics feed back into the insecurities that intensify domestic repression. 
The post-Cold War era is replete with examples of the application of mimetic 
violence. The cold peace was essentially constructed on this. On the one side, the failure of 
the West to resolve its own societal and political problems accentuated the process whereby 
problems were externalised in the form of some sort of spiritual threat to the West. Too 
often Russia became the archetypical scapeJRDW µRWKHU¶ D IRUP RI UHOHDVH RI PLPHWLF
violence; a way for the West to externalise its own contradictions and to project them on to 
some sacrificial victim. For Girard this is a classic position in which societal contradictions 
are projected onto a particular individual or group, and thus prevents the violence engulfing 
society as a whole.30 By externalising violence, the sacred core of a society can be 
preserved. In the contemporary world the universal principle takes specific forms, and is 
the counterpart of a hegemonic world order. The axiological articulation of a particular set 
of values is accompanied by the denigration of those who do not unreservedly subscribe to 
those values in the form in which they are presented. Thus the politics of normative 
assertion provokes the opposite of the espoused virtues, especially when applied in a 
selective and partial manner. 
Liberal pluralism gave way to axiological monism, which eroded the putative 
pluralistic foundations of modern democratic societies. Instead of value pluralism, which in 
international politics takes the form of a diversity of regime types and civilizational 
complexes, a single desirable form of immanence was proposed. The uncritical acceptance 
of much of the Russiagate narrative suggests that open societies can generate closed minds 
                                                 
28
 Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Riga, 21-22 May 2015, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/05/21-22/. 
29
 The term is used in 2 Thessalonians 2: 6-7 in an eschatological context, in which Paul argues 
that Christians should not behave as if the second coming was imminent, since the force holding 
back the antichrist and thus the end of time had still to be revealed. Schmitt identifies the 
NDWƝFKRQ with the Roman Empire and the Christian imperium that followed, and more broadly as 
the restraint against chaos. Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the 
Jus Publicum Europaeum, trs. G.L. Ulmen (New York, Telos Press, 2003), pp. 59±60. Numerous 
other interpretations have been advanced, but in this work the NDWƝFKRQ will be analogous to the 
Leviathan, who prevents the war of all against all.  
30
 Scott Cowdell, Chris Fleming and Joel Hodge, 9LROHQFH 'HVLUH DQG WKH 6DFUHG *LUDUG¶V
Mimetic Theory across the Disciplines (London, Continuum, 2012). 
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as much as the more traditional forms of authoritarianism.31 In the international system we 
encounter the paradox that the collective espousal of what is sometimes presented as the 
liberal peace functions as a mechanism to exclude those who have not yet matured to the 
point at which the conventions of the liberal peace can be applied to them.32 Thus an inner 
FRUH LV FUHDWHG WR ZKLFK WKH µXQLYHUVDO¶ QRUPV DSSO\ ZKLOH WKH UHVW ODQJXLVK LQ WKH
antechamber of history. 7KHLQHYLWDEOHUHVLVWDQFHRI WKHµWKHUHVW¶ WKHQJHQHUDWHVPLPHWLF
violence and the scapegoating of the rest as the cause of the problems of the core. This, in 
simplified terms, can be considered the mimetic aetiology of the new cold war. 
0RUH WKDQ WKLV FRPPHQWLQJ RQ &ODXVHZLW]¶V LGHD RI µH[WHUPLQDWLQJ WKH HQHP\¶
*LUDUG QRWHV WKDW µKH ZDV SURSKHWLF ZLWKRXW UHDOL]LQJ LW « WKH LGHRORJLFDO ZDUV WKDW he 
predicted, in which politics tries to keep up with war, proved to be terrible crusades that 
resulted in the massacre of entire populations. Carl Schmitt noted this when he spoke of 
µWKH³WKHRORJL]DWLRQ´RIZDULQZKLFKWKHHQHP\EHFRPHVDQ(YLO¶6FKPLtt considered that 
KLV DWWHPSW WR UHVWUDLQ YLROHQFH WKURXJK µWKH OHJDO FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI GHVLJQDWHG HQHPLHV¶
represented progress, but legalism is unable to prevent the escalation to extremes and even 
provokes this mimetic escalation. Thus Schmitt anticipated the development of 
humanitarian intervention, but sought to constrain it within the framework of a new nomos.  
Girard notes the relentless escalation of violence since the Second World War and 
GLVPLVVHV 6FKPLWW¶V µOHJDO YROXQWDULVP¶33 Although globalisation theory predicts greater 
differentiation rather than flattening, contrary to theories of interdependence economic 




The didactic character of much Western policy vis-à-vis Russia, embedded in the practices 
RIWKHSROLWLFDOIRUPDWLRQNQRZQDVWKHµOLEHUDOSHDFH¶is also a type of violence in that it 
presumes a superiority that reinforces hegemonic structures of power. This is what I call 
                                                 
31
 In fact, there is a large literature indicating that conditions of political authoritarianism forces 
traditional intellectuals to devise forms of inner freedom. For example, Vaclav Havel, The Power 
of the Powerless. 
32
 See Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century 
(New York, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003), who argues that the normative rules applicable to the 
zone of peace do not necessarily extend to those not yet encompassed by its values. As he puts it, 
µ)RU WKH SRVW-modern state there is, therefore, a difficulty. It needs to get used to the idea of 
double standards. Among themselves, the post-modern states operate on the basis of laws and 
open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of state outside the 
post-modern limits, Europeans need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era ± force, pre-
emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary for those who still live in the nineteenth-century 
ZRUOGRIHYHU\VWDWHIRULWVHOI,QWKHMXQJOHRQHPXVWXVHWKHODZVRIWKHMXQJOH¶S. 62). This is a 
classic case of norm contestation acting as a form of mimetic violence. 
33
 *LUDUGQRWHVWKDWWKHµOHJDOFRQVWUXFWLRQRIGHVLJQDWHGHQHPLHV¶µLVWKHWKHVLVRIFHUWDLQULJKW-
ZLQJSROLWLFV,WOHDGVWRDWKHRU\RID³VWDWHRIH[FHSWLRQ´WKDWPany are calling for today, given 
the growing threats. This is the strength but also the limitation of this line of thought. It is true 
that it points out the danger of pacifism: to outlaw war is paradoxically to allow it to spread 
everywhere. Pacifism fans WKHILUHVRIZDUPRQJHULQJ+RZHYHU&DUO6FKPLWW¶VOHJDOYROXQWDULVP
has proven vain because the aftermath of World War II has shown that the escalation to extremes 
KDVEHHQUHOHQWOHVV¶*LUDUGBattling to the End, p. 65. 
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adaptive mimesis, in which autonomous political subjectivity is effectively diminished by 
HQJDJHPHQW LQ µUHIRUP¶ D FRGHZRUGGHVLJQDWLQJGLVVDWLVIDFWLRQ ZLWKRQH¶VRZQSUHVHQW
DQGWKHDWWHPSWWRDGDSW WRVRPHQRUPDWLYHVWDQGDUGVVHWRXWVLGHRQH¶VRZQhistorical or 
developmental experience. For Aristotle, mimesis is the way in which people learn, as a 
child copies the behaviour of adults and thus is educated in the ways of adults. A child until 
a certain age is deprived of legal autonomy, and so it is by analogy with states, where 
political subjectivity, if not political sovereignty, is diminished. This, ultimately, is the 
epistemological foundation of democratisation theory on which the vast post-Cold War 
literature on transitology is based.34 
For Russia, which has been locked in a form of catch-up modernisation for 
generations, this is a particularly salient issue. TKHKLVWRU\RI5XVVLD¶V HQJDJHPHQWZLWK
Western modernity has been accompanied by traditionalist concerns that adaptive 
mimesis would lead Russia to lose some of its µDXWKHQWLF¶ LGHQWLW\DV LWFRSLHG:HVWHUQ
models of development and denigrated its own customs. Despite this, Russia for several 
centuries has been a prickly yet eager student, desperate for a learning that would confirm 
its place in the community of European civilised states. Since Peter the Great opened his 
µZLQGRZWRWKH:HVW¶WKHWHQVLRQEHWZHHQ5XVVLDDVDQDGHSWDQGDVDPDVWHUKDVQHYHU
been reconciled.35 7RGD\WKLVWDNHVWKHIRUPRIDVWUXJJOHEHWZHHQ5XVVLD¶Vtorn identity 
as the most eastern of the western powers, or as the most western of the eastern 
civilisations. 
This dynamic shapes the modern history of Russia. Viatcheslav Morozov calls 
5XVVLDDµVXEDOWHUQHPSLUH¶. It is subaltern because its vision of modernity is ultimately 
derivative, generated by Europe, with whom it has traditionally had an ambivalent 
relationship; but its self-image as a great power perpetuates the imperial dimension, with 
profound consequences for its domestic and international policies. Russia has been 
Europeanised, and can thus offer no vision of an alternative modernity; but it claims to be 
DPRUHDXWKHQWLFYHUVLRQRIWKDWPRGHUQLW\WRZKLFKLWDVSLUHVWKHµWUXH¶(XURSHWKDWZDV
already articulated in the nineteenth century.36 The subaltern relationship means that the 
KHJHPRQLFVRFLDORUGHUGRHVQRWDOORZ5XVVLD¶VYRLFHWREHKHDUGEXWWKHLPSHULDOVHOI-
identity insists that its voice is heard, hence the endless tensions, crises and contradictions 
of our time.37 This is a classic and perhaps quintessential mimetic relationship, where the 
object of desire is defined by the experience of the other. This helps explain the mimetic 
crisis in which Russia and Europe now find themselves. 
Even the Bolshevik experiment was at heart an attempt to find an emancipated 
version of Western modernity: seeking to transcend the contradictions while fulfilling the 
potential that the founding fathers of Soviet-type socialism recognised lay within that 
                                                 
34
 For example, most articles in the Journal of Democracy have the profoundly axiological tone 
of adaptive mimesis, grounded in a belief in the immanence of the liberal democratic order.  
35
 Martin Malia, Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin 
Mausoleum (Cambridge, Mass., Belknap, 2000). 
36
 Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International 
Relations (London, Routledge, 2016). 
37
 Viatcheslav Morozov, 5XVVLD¶V 3RVWFRORQLDO ,GHQWLW\ $ 6XEDOWHUQ (PSLUH LQ D (XURFHQWULF
World (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
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modernity.38 The Soviet experiment represented an attempt to create an alternative 
modernity to the degree that it differed from the practices of Western capitalism, but in 
the end failed to sustain itself as a coherent alternative social order.39 This is the 
philosophical basis for Vladimir 3XWLQ UHSXGLDWLQJ WKH ODQJXDJH RI µUHIRUP¶ ZKen he 
came to power in 2000. He refused to accept that the template for Russia had been forged 
elsewhere. For him this was no doubt an intuitive rather than a conceptual response, yet 
his repudiation of revolution and other-oriented reform was already outlined in his 
µ0LOOHQQLXP 0DQLIHVWo¶ LQ 'HFHPEHU 40 This reflected a profound feature of 
5XVVLD¶V VHOI-identity: the belief that Russia could not borrow the history of others but 
had to fulfil its own destiny, a view that in axiological forms is itself a form of immanent 
thinking. 
7KHFRQFHSWRIµUHIRUP¶ LVQRZVHHQSUHFLVHO\DVDQH[SUHVVLRQRI WKHVXEDOWHUQ
relationship. Reform suggests adaptation to norms and practices generated elsewhere. In 
WKH 5XVVLDQ FRQWH[W 3XWLQ¶V VWURQJ DQWLSDWK\ WR WKH WHUP LV reinforced by the painful 
experience of Mikhail *RUEDFKHY¶VUHIRUPVZKLFKLQWKHHQGSURYRNHGWKHGLVVROXWLRQRI
the communist system and the disintegration of the country. 7KH VWUHVV RQ µVRYHUHLJQ
GHPRFUDF\¶DGYDQFHGDERYHDOOE\WKH.UHPOLQ¶VFKLHILGeologist up to December 2011, 
Vladislav Surkov, explicitly rejected adaptive mimesis, which was considered to have a 
violent element at its coreQDPHO\ WKHGHVWUXFWLRQRI5XVVLD¶VDXWRFKWKRQRXV WUDGLWLRQV
and the negation of its historical experience.41 The West set itself up as mentor, which 
could not but reduce the subjectivity of the learner.42 This helps explain the 
XQFRPIRUWDEOHFRQQRWDWLRQVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHFRQFHSWRIµGHPRFUDF\¶LQFRQWHPSRUDU\
Russian political discourse. Like the notion of reform LW LVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK WKHµWLPHRI
WURXEOHV¶ LQ WKH V DQG WKH ORVV RI SROLWLFDO VXEMHFWLYLW\ Democracy represents the 
relaxation of NDWƝFKRQLF authority and the weakening of the Putinite Leviathan, with the 






can be perceived as the continuation of tutelary violence by other means. This gives rise 
to the third form of the phenomenon, what I call mimetic simulacra. For Plato mimesis is a 
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 3HUU\$QGHUVRQµ,QFRPPHQVXUDWH5XVVLD¶New Left Review, No. 94, July-August 2015, pp. 5-
43. 
39
 Johann P. Arnason, The Future that Failed: Origins and Destinies of the Soviet Model 
(London, Routledge, 1993). 
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 9ODGLPLU3XWLQ µ$SSHQGL[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Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin, with Nataliya 
Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova, and Andrei Kolesnikov, translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick 
(London, Hutchinson, 2000), pp. 209-219. 
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 Vladislav Surkov µ1DWLRQDOLVDWLRQ RI WKH )XWXUH¶ LQ 9ODGLVODY 6XUNRY Texts (Moscow, 
Evropa, 2010), pp. 59-72. 
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 For a case study of the tutelary relationship JHQHUDWHGE\WKH(8¶VSUH-international and post-
diplomatic logic of normative relations, see Sergei Prozorov, Understanding Conflict between 
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form of copying, but it lacks the benign pedagogical impulse that is at the heart of the 
Aristotelian conception. Mimetic politics is what the West does when it says to the rest of 
the world that they must copy the West in order to move beyond their current state of 
infantilism (the Aristotelian version). The immanent goal may well be good governance, 
the rule of law and secure property rights, but these are embedded in a particular culture of 
politics of a hegemonic power system. From the Platonic perspective, mimetic politics 
lacks authenticity since it copies the form but lacks the substance. The revolt against 
universalising discourses reflects an innate Platonic conception of mimesis as mere 
imitation and estrangement from truth and originality, and reinforces the search for a 
genuinely foundational Russian tradition in art and politics.43 The mimetic introduction of 
the form at the expense of substance has allegedly produced a particularly lifeless form of 
SROLWLFV 'PLWU\ )XUPDQ KDV WDONHG RI µLPLWDWLYH GHPRFUDF\¶ LQ ZKLFK WKH VRFLDO
institutions of democracy are imported, but in the absence of the appropriate socio-
cultural life world, they become merely pale imitations of the institutions taken from the 
West.44 Simulacratic mimesis can only be challenged by a substantive reinvestment in 
politics and the political process. 
 The adaptive mimesis advanced by the West is countered in Russia by the Putinite 
regime proposing its own form of tutelary politics. TKHQRWLRQRIµVRYHUHLJQGHPRFUDF\¶
was the subject of innumerable articles and discussions, but Putin himself was always 
uncomfortable with the term. By seeking to give a formal conceptual framework for the 
practices of the regime, his leadership would be constrained and hostage to the 
philosophical formulations of others. Yet the authenticity sought by the Putinite system 
has only accentuated copying without learning, leading to the creation of a host of para-
constitutional bodies, each one a simulacra of the body it copies. Thus the State Duma is 
shadowed by the Civic Chamber FRQVWLWXWHG WKURXJK QRPLQDWLRQ D W\SH RI µVRFLDO
SDUOLDPHQW¶WKDWVXEVtitutes for the elected body. Equally, the State Council substitutes for 
the upper house, the Federation Council, of the bicameral parliament. Towering above 
them all is the Presidential Administration, a body with no constitutional status yet acting 
as a duplicate government. In sum, the whole organic complex of the constitutional state 
is rendered subaltern by the prerogatives claimed by the apparatus of the administrative 
regime.45  
The Putin system operates by accentuating ambiguity and draws its power from 
applying conventional categories of politics (democracy, elections, constitutionalism), 
but rendering them into simulacra of what would normally be considered the real thing. 
The culture of mimetic politics is structured by the three elements outlined in this section: 
the ambient mimetic violence projected into the structure of international affairs by the 
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September 2010, pp. 185-206. 
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tension between the hegemonic ambitions of the leading Western powers and Russian 
resistance; this is then reinforced by a normative level of interactions, adaptive mimesis, 
which suggests that the West knows something that Russia does not ± namely how to live 
in the modern world, and how to achieve the good life; and Russia until recently 
considered itself part of the West, and hence adopted the forms of Western democratic 
modernity, but these tend to become mere imitative simulacra in conditions of the 
NDWƝFKRnic practices of a tutelary regime that stymies the development of the institutions of 
the constitutional state. 
 
Axiological politics:  democracy and the NDWƝFKRQ  
 
The concept of political culture has long sought to explain the dynamics of the relationship 
EHWZHHQDQDWLRQ¶VSRZHUV\VWHPDQGVRFLHWDORULHQWDWLRQVWRZDUGVSROLWLFVZKDWZDVRQFH
called the behavioural revolution in political science.46 By contrast, this paper explores the 
framework in which a political system acts and the quality of political relations as a 
whole.47 Instead of political culture, the focus is on the cognate yet distinctive concept of 
µFXOWXUHVRISRZHU¶.48 The contrast between axiological and dialogical politics is at the heart 
of my analysis. Axiological politics assumes that some things have been settled outside of 
the political process, and thus certain issues DUHWUHDWHGDVµD[LRPDWLF¶This is based on the 
belief in an immanent order that simply needs to brought into existence. In such a praxis, 
there is little room for agonistic politics dealing with fundamental societal choices. 
7KHFRQFHSWRIµD[LRORJ\¶LVVXVFHSWLEOHWRVHYHUDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQV, but in this paper 
it is used to denote a form of politics that is categorical, monological and ideological. 
Categorical politics becomes a means for the implementation of a priori positions and 
delegitimizes whole areas of social life from political enquiry. Its monological aspect 
assumes that answers have already been found to questions of human community, and 
hence there is no need for discussion and debate over how to resolve issues that are no 
longer problematised. The ideological aspect means that the alleged resolution is no longer 
tested through an agonistic process of deliberation but delivered a priori as the solution to 
the problem of human community.  
This sort of thinking is based on a historicist approach to development. Thus, 
Marxism becomes an ideology when it loses its critical and reflexive character, and instead 
assumes dogmatic forms that are intolerant of dissent and debate. If the riddle of history has 
been resolved, then those who question the established truth are not only wayward but in 
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some way repulsive and reprehensible.49 During the 25 years of the cold peace in the post-
Cold War era, Marxist historicism was inverted to give way to a liberal historicism, 
attended by Hegelian QRWLRQVRI WKH µHQGRIKLVWRU\¶50 Once again, those who stood out 
against this tide of liberal historicism were stigmatised as deviant in some way. Politics 
became instrumental, and thus deprived of what many have argued is its agonistic essence: 
the organised and constrained struggle over fundamental choices in the life of the 
community.51 By contrast, axiological politics denigrates the political subjectivity of actors, 
whether individuals, larger groupings or entire states. Mimetic scapegoating is applied not 
only to alleged and real deviations from the norms but even more to those who challenge 
the legitimacy of the culture of power that sets the norms.  
The notion of course is an ideal type. Public affairs will always contain an 
irreducible quotient of axiological politics, otherwise executive action would be 
impossible; but the democratic ideal suggests that this can be tempered by the structured 
HQJDJHPHQW RI GLIIHUHQW SROLWLFDO VXEMHFWV LQ D µFRPPXQLFDWLYH¶ SURFHVV DV -UJHQ
Habermas has long argued.52 However, dialogical politics differs in some significant 
UHVSHFWVIURP+DEHUPDV¶VFRPPXQLFDWLYHLQWHUDFWLRQV)LUVWLWGLVSHQVHVZLWKWKHLPSOLFLW
KLHUDUFK\ RI UHODWLRQV LQ +DEHUPDV¶V WKHRU\ VHHQ VR QRWDEO\ LQ KLV GLVFXVVLRQ RI SRVW-
secularism, where the views of the others are engaged because they exist, but are treated in 
a condescending manner.53 In other words, the views of the other are to be respected, but 
essentially they are considered from the perspective of a superior us. Tolerance is not the 
same as dialogical engagement with others. This reproduces classical patterns of adaptive 
mimesis. Boundaries are reinforced and not challenged. Second, the communicative 
process is implicitly founded on the idea of settled identities, and thus the problem of 
liminality is not adequately integrated into the theory.54 In the case of Russia this is 
particularly important. The country since 1985 has been engaged in an intense process of 
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identity formation, hence it is not a settled interlocutor but has a deeply liminal identity, 
which remains in flux and is torn by deeply contested representations of the ideal. 
 While this was a liminal period for Russia, for most of the central European states 
the problem was the straightforward one of how to achieve adaptive mimesis to the 
norms of the Atlantic community. There is a fundamental incommensurability between 
these two types of political transformation, an experiential divergence that has become 
fraught with grave geopolitical consequences. But even adaptive mimesis is not without 
its problems, undermining the quality of democracy at the very moment of its apparent 
triumph. .UDVWHYDUJXHV WKDW µWKH LGHRORJ\RI ³QRUPDOLW\´ZKLFK LQVSLUHGSHRSOH LQ WKH
streets of Berlin, Prague, and Sofia in 1989 succeeded in reconciling liberalism and 
democracy ± but at DFRVW)RUWKHGULYHWR³QRUPDOL]H´GHPRFUDF\WKDWLVWRIUHHLWIURP
its historical contradictions) contributed to its current crisis by weakening the democratic 
LPPXQHV\VWHP¶)RUKLPWKH ODVWLQJ OHJDF\RIZDVQRW WKHVSUHDGRIGHPRFUDF\
but tKHµUHYROXWLRQLQRXUexpectations RIGHPRFUDF\¶55  
 In the post-Cold War era, democracy was posited as the solution to the problems of 
development and marginality, transcending the historical gulf between liberalism and 
democracy, and indeed, between democracy and capitalism. For those who had lacked 
democracy for a generation or more, its achievement promised to resolve these 
contradictions of modernity. In most of Eastern and Central Europe µ7KH SROLWLFV RI
³QRUPDOL]DWLRQ´ UHSODFHG GHOLEHUDWLRQ ZLWK LPLWDWLRQ¶. This provoked an intellectual 
SDUDO\VLVWKDWDOORZHGµGHPRFUDF\¶DQGµJRRGJRYHUQDQFH¶WREHXVHGDVV\QRQ\PV56 µ%\
declaring democracy the normal state of society and restricting democratization to an 
imitation of the institutions and practicHV RI GHYHORSHG GHPRFUDFLHV &HQWUDO (XURSH¶V
ideology of normality failed to give rein to the creative tensions that do so much to 
VXSSO\ GHPRFUDF\ ZLWK LWV IOH[LELOLW\ DQG HQGXUDQFH¶57 Instead, one of the dominant 
PHPHV ZDV WKH µUHWXUQ WR (XURSH¶ ZKHUHEy the temporal utopia of revolutionary 
socialism (building socialism in some future time frame) was replaced by the spatial 
imaginary of resolving the problems of history by borrowing the solutions devised in the 
KLVWRU\ RI RWKHUV 3DUDGR[LFDOO\ WKH µUHWXUQ RI KLVWRU\¶ ZDV DFKLHYHG SUHFLVHO\ E\
repudiating the regional history of the countries concerned. The shift from temporal to 
spatial representations of the future by definition closed the imaginative space to devise 
original solutions to classic problems.58 
Girard identified the essentially mimetic character of democracy, although 
shrouded in religious and mythological representations. The typical response is the creation 
of a Leviathan state, to ensure that mimetic violence does not spin out of control. In other 
words, there is a permanent mimetic crisis that requires some sort of NDWƝFKRQLF response. It 
FRXOG EH DUJXHG WKDW WKH ZKROH YDVW OLWHUDWXUH LQ VXSSRUW RI $PHULFD¶V SRVW-Cold War 
hegemony as the essential buttress of the liberal world order is no more than a 
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reformulation of this argument in idealist terms. In this context, Girard recognised that Carl 
Schmitt was the pre-eminent theorist of crisis. Schmitt recognised that the friend/foe 
distinction allowed the scapegoat to be recognised and cast out; but above all Schmitt 
considered that legal means could restrain the violence inherent in human community.59 
Girard was sceptical about whether the constitutional state could constrain violence, and 
instead argued that social order was preserved by the sacrificial mechanism. Schmittian 
constitutionalism is accompanied by the neutralisation of the political, but it does not claim 
to be able to contain the mimetic violence generated by democratic egalitarianism.  
An alternative to the NDWƝFKRQLF approach to politics and international order is to 
revalorise politics itself. This can be done in two complementary ways. The first is to argue 
that Girard has conflated the crowd with the people, okhlocracy with democracy. 
'XPRXFKHO¶VVWXG\RILQGLYLGXDODQGPDVVkillings is a powerful representation of mimetic 
violence, but the reader wonders about the absence of the citizen, and the whole construct 
of the constitutional state and body of law that vests the citizen with legitimacy, status, and 
ultimately indeed power. The citizen has a different political subjectivity to that of the 
undifferentiated member of the crowd. From the perspective of the argument in this paper, 
the quality of citizenship is measured by the degree of dialogical engagement with the 
issues facing the political community. This is a permanent politics of krisis, defined as we 
have seen as a moment of reflection in the life of the community. But instead of the crisis 
being momentary and fleeting, it is a permanent feature that ensures that politics retains a 
creative liminal character. I shall return to this issue later. 
 The second way to resolve the undoubted mimetic character of much of modern 
democracy is to deny its agonistic quality and to reduce it to the mechanical aggregation of 
votes, an apodictic procedure without value and ultimate purpose and deprived of the 
µSROLWLFV RI YLUWXH¶60 As Stéphane Vinolo argues, Spinoza had considered democracy in 
terms of an absolute regime, an absolutum imperium, which could guarantee peace and 
harmony not because of the quality of its values but because, paradoxically, of the 
renunciation of its values. The legitimacy of the majority is derived from its numerical 
predominance, which reduces democracy to a mathematical aggregation but by the same 
token negates the potential for mimetic violence.61 This resolves the problem by reducing 
politics to the maintenance of order, and thus removes the agonistic essence of a genuinely 
political process. This describes the eviscerated character of much of liberal democracy 
today. 
Both Girard and Schmitt advance an interactional model of human identity, which 
sustains their critiques of liberal individualism. The romantic modern notion that personal 
identity is generated spontaneously and expresses some substantive and essential character 
that is self-determined is contrasted to their view that identity is socially constructed. As 
Andrea Salvatore puts it:  
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According to Girard, romantic ideology cultivates the myth of an autonomously 
desiring subject by claiming that human desires are essentially spontaneous and 
unmediated. Romantic subject rejects God and sanctify any object that can provide 
him the certainty of his own uniqueness and its ontological self-sufficiency. 
6LPLODUO\6FKPLWWGHILQHVSROLWLFDOURPDQWLFLVPDVµVXEMHFWLYLVHGRFFDVLRQDOLVP¶D
definition that brings together the personal powerlessness and the social 
ineffectiveness of the free subject. Political romanticism represents the latest stage 
of the process of secularisation, in which the individual becomes the ultimate reality 
and the genius takes the place of God as the Creator.62 
 
Girard and Schmitt stress the religious foundation of societal order. Schmitt stressed how 
µ$OO VLJQLILFDQW FRQFHSWV RI WKH PRGHUQ WKHRU\ RI WKH VWDWH DUH VHFXODUL]HG WKHRORJLFDO
cRQFHSWV¶63 Radical secularisation threatens WRXQGHUPLQHVRFLHW\¶VDZDUHQHVVRI LWVRZQ
SUHFDULRXVIRXQGDWLRQVDQGUHOLJLRQ¶VUROHLQUHVWUDLQLQJDQGFKDQQHOOLQJYLROHQFHDQGWKH
mechanisms making possible the political community, the decision for Schmitt and the rite 
for Girard. This is undergirded by a shift in the meaning of the saeculum, the period of 
ZDLWLQJIRUWKH$XJXVWLQH¶VHDUWKO\FLW\ZKHUHFRQIOLFWFDQDWEHVWEHPDQDJHGWREHFRPH
WKHµRQWRORJLFDOSHDFH¶RIWKHThe City of God. As Michael Kirwan argues, the loss of the 
eschatological dimension reduces the tension between the two to little more than a 
0DQLFKHDQGXDOLVPµDFRQFHUQIRU³WZRMXULVGLFWLRQV´RIHVVHQWLDOO\FRPSHWLQJFODLPVWZR
NLQJGRPVWZRVZRUGV¶DQGVRRQ64 The doctrine of the µWZRNLQJGRPV¶LVRIFRXUVHLVDW
the heart of Lutheran and some Calvinist thinking, dividing governance between the secular 
and spiritual worlds.  
William Cavanaugh notes that this is rooted in the shift in the meaning of saeculum 
from a temporal notion, WKHSHULRGRIZDLWLQJEHIRUHWKHRQVHWRI*RG¶VJUDFHWRDVSDWLDO
FRQFHSW WKH VSKHUH RI µWKH VHFXODU¶ ZKLFK UHGXFHV PDWWHUV WR FRQWHVWDWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH
competing jurisdictions, the secular and the temporal.65 The Westphalian gambit of 
resolving intense religious conflict by giving the secular authorities the power to decide the 
religion of their jurisdiction forces the church into the defensive territory as a subaltern 
power, and effectively become little more than one political actor among others.66 The state 
is here posited as the peacemaker, the NDWƝFKRQ, the Leviathan acting to restrain the 
destructive violence. Although Girard rejects the idea of the social contract, he agrees with 
Hobbes on the conflict-ridden quality of human community, hence recourse to the saving 
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properties of the Leviathan. For Cavanaugh, this soteriology of the state absorbs the church 
and renders it little more than a subaltern association.67 
One of the most profound contradictions of Putinism is the attempt to reconstitute 
the katƝchonic features of the Westphalian state, acting as the Leviathan-like protector of 
social order and acting as the putative bulwark against the dissolution of order. This is why 
the administrative regime is careful to avoid being subsumed into the constitutional state, 
where it would lose its autonomy and ability to exercise the Schmittian decisionism that 
has been the hallmark of the Russian culture of power for so long. The revalorisation of the 
Russian Orthodox Church (together with other organised and recognised religions) as the 
generator of values and civilisational standards not only grants NDWƝFKRQic power a 
legitimacy derived not from the ballot box but the appeal to certain apparently eternal 
values and above all the value of stability. Putin has often been accused of an instrumental 
approach to Orthodoxy, and there is some truth in the charge to the degree that the 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYH V\VWHP GUDZV RQ WKH VDFUDO HOHPHQWV RI 5XVVLD¶V RUJDQLVHG UHOLJLRQV EXW
refuses ultimately to identify with any. The Russian political situation remains wide open 
(liminal), but the politics of stability means that the fundamental choices facing the country 
are not given autonomous political expression ± are not solved through agonistic politics ± 
and thus are not resolved. The open political situation, paradoxically, is perpetuated by the 
closure of the political system. Society has not been able to respond with the agonistic 
thinking characteristic of a genuine politics of krisis, let alone a genuine dialogical 
engagement between its constituents and outsiders. Fundamental questions remain 
unresolved. 
 
Towards a dialogical politics 
 
The end of the Cold War was accompanied not by the transcendence of the logic of 
conflict, as sought by Gorbachev and his successors in Russia, but by the logic of 
enlargement of an already existing and operative system, the Atlantic community (with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union at their core). The politics of 
expansion accentuated the monological, and thus axiological, character of contemporary 
European politics. This entailed a number of mimetic structures, three of which have been 
identified above, accompanied by the prevalence of a set of axiological practices. We have 
entered an era of mimetic politics that take Girardian, Aristotelian and Platonic forms. The 
form is preserved but the substance of what makes politics political has been lost.68 This is 
seen at its sharpest in the various forms of axiological politics outlined above. At the same 
time, there is a counter-movement to this axiological style of politics. I label this counter-
movement dialogical politics. It seeks to establish a space for autonomy and resistance to 
the dominance of the social forms of the hegemonic regime at the international and national 
levels, and seeks to give recognition to the substantive SROLWLFDOVXEMHFWLYLW\RIWKHµRWKHU¶ 
In our case, this would have meant the transformation of what Russians call the 
µ+LVWRULF:HVW¶LQWRD*UHDWHU:HVWZKHUHWKHFRPPXQLW\ZRXOGKDYHEHHQUHFRQVWLWXWHG
with Russia as a founder member, but where all of its members would have been 
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transformed by engagement with each other. This is the process that Gorbachev had in 
PLQGZKHQKHSURSRVHGWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDµ&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ+RPH¶IURP/LVERQWR
9ODGLYRVWRN ,QVWHDG RI WKH PRQRORJLFDO H[SDQVLRQ RI WKH (8 D µJUHDWHU (XURSH¶ ZRXOG
have been created in which all of its participants would have been transformed through a 
process of interactive engagement. This would have been political dialogism in action, but 
instead the expansion of the old Atlantic community only exacerbated axiological 
processes and mimetic conflict. These tensions were then re-absorbed by the body politic, 
VWLPXODWLQJ WKH RXWEUHDN RI PLPHWLF YLROHQFH LQ WKH IRUP RI WKH µZLWFK-KXQW¶ mentioned 
above. 
The essence of a dialogical politics is the recognition of equal political subjectivity 
for political actors and the repudiation of the historicism, linearity and mechanistic 
characteristics of dialectical politics. Above all, it entails the repudiation of a politics of 
immanence and allows for transcendence. Although Girard drew on Hegel for his 
understanding of conflictual desire, Girard is not a Hegelian and instead propounds a non-
GLDOHFWLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKXPDQLQWHUDFWLRQ+HGRHVWDONRIDµQRYHOLVWLFGLDOHFWLF¶DQG
in a manner reminiscent of Mikhail Bakhtin describes enlightenment in the works of 
Dostoevsky, Proust and others. Here the characters, unlike in the works of Hegel and 
Sartre, struggle for conversion from false to genuine transcendence in an Augustinian 
rather than a Hegelian manner.69 Dialogical politics shifts attention from the institutional 
level, where executives will always seek to achieve axiological outcomes, while 
legislatures by definition engage in some sort of dialogical process but in a competitive 
environment parties seek advantage rather than some sort of truth, to more fundamental 
categories dealing with the quality of political relationships and modes of engagement with 
the political process itself. This shapes our understanding of democracy and the 
relationship between the state and society 
In international affairs this means overcoming limited sovereignty regimes in 
favour of the recognition of multiple centres of civilizational and political identity. This is 
more than the multipolarity that has long been propounded by Russian leaders, but is closer 
to the multiplicity argued for by Schmitt in his notion of the pluriverse.70 It is also 
UHPLQLVFHQW RI WKH µPXOWLSOH PRGHUQLWLHV¶ DSSURDFK WR WKH VWXG\ RI GHYHORSPHQW DQG
modernisation.71 Geopolitics is certainly fundamental to post-Cold War axiology, but 
dialogical politics entails a double movement: countering the logic of axiological politics in 
the international sphere accompanied by revalorisation of substantive political community 
in domestic matters. The two are profoundly inter-connected and are effectively part of a 
single process. In the case of Russia, it is often lamented that if only it had become a 
democracy, then there would be no challenge to the hegemonic international system; but it 
could equally be argued, without the hegemonic practices of the current structure of 
international relations, then there would have been more chance of Russia becoming a 
democracy.  
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Contemporary dialogical politics are inspired by a number of ideas and 
characterised by a distinctive set of practices. The Enlightenment as a project is often 
considered to have an inherent monological dimension, countered according to some critics 
by the luxurious pluralism of postmodernity and postsecularity.72 At the heart of the 
µPRQRORJXH RI WKH (QOLJKWHQPHQW¶ LV LWs anti-religiosity, which in the end presents an 
eviscerated representation of individual freedom.73 Of course, this is a greatly simplified 
understanding of the Enlightenment, but it does identify the attempt to desacralize political 
life. At the heart of dialogical politics is the repudiation of the dialectical method, and with 
it the reduction of human experience to simplified formulations. Maurice Merleau-Ponty is 
famous for his challenge to traditional dialectical thinking in his explorations of the 
meaning of human experience. Hans-*HRUJ *DGDPHU¶V H[SORUDWLRQV LQ µSKLORVRSKLFDO
KHUPHQHXWLFV¶FULWLFLVHGWKHDWWHPSWWRUHGXFHWKHVWXG\RIWKHKXPDQLWLHVWRWKHPHWKRGVRI
the natural sciences.74 HLV ZRUN RQ µGLDORJXH DQG GLDOHFWLF¶75 DV ZHOO DV HVVD\V RQ µWKH
UHOHYDQFH RI WKH EHDXWLIXO¶, are fundamental to understanding dialogical politics.76 His 
focus on particularity and specificity within a dynamic whole are crucial for developing the 
concept.  
 %DNKWLQ¶V WKLQNLQJ GUDZV RQ WKLV WUDGLWLRQ WR DSSO\ D VWXG\ RI Fultural forms, 
knowledge and society to provide an original approach to the relationship of the individual 
and society.77 , ZLOO IRFXV RQO\ RQ %DNKWLQ¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH GLDORJLFDO78 Bakhtin 
examined the way that humans use language, and advanced a dialogical concept of its use. 
,WLVRQWKLVEDVLVWKDW0LFKDHO+ROTXLVWFRLQHGWKHWHUPµGLDORJLVP¶DZRUGWKDW%DNKWLQ
never used.79 +ROTXLVWQRWHV%DNKWLQ¶VDWWUDFWLRQWRWKHQHR-Kantian Marburg school, and in 
particular the works of Hermann Cohen, for its emphasis on unity and oneness; 
accompanied by his lifelong preoccupation with the problem of dialogue. The neo-Kantian 
FRQFHUQZLWKRYHUFRPLQJWKHGXDOLW\EHWZHHQµPLQG¶DQGµVSLULW¶LQ%DNKWLQ¶VWKLQNLQJWRRN
a distinctive turn:  
 
In dialogism, the very capacity to have consciousness is based on otherness. This 
otherness is not merely a dialectical alienation on its way to a sublation that will 
endow it with a unifying identity in higher consciousness. On the contrary: in 
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dialogism consciousness is otherness. More accurately, it is the differential relation 
between a center and all that is not that center.80  
 
For our purposes, the political import is clear: inherent in dialogue is the constitution of 
distinct subjectivities, with a valance that is innate and not created by the relationship with 
the central other; although for Bakhtin the self is never an independent construct but 
µGLDORJLF¶DUHODWLRQ81 +HQFHµ'LDORJLVPLVDIRUPRIDUFKLWHFWRQLFVWKHJHQHUDOVFLHQFHRI
RUGHULQJ SDUWV LQWR D ZKROH ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV DUFKLWHFWRQLFV LV WKH VFLHQFH RI UHODWLRQV¶ D
permanently dynamic set of ratios and proportions. 82 To put it simply, the self is to society 
what words are to language.83 
 In his studies of Dostoevsky, Bakhtin argues that dialogue is not a means to an end, 
but is at the core of action itself. The variegated voices constitute a dialogical entity, which 
is very different from a dialectical relatioQVKLS $V %DNKWLQ SXW LW µ7DNHDGLDORJXHDQG
remove the voices (the partitioning of voices), remove the intonations (emotional and 
individualizing ones), carve out abstract concepts and judgments from living words and 
responses, cram everything into one abstract consciousness ± DQG WKDW¶V KRZ \RX JHW
GLDOHFWLFV¶84 Hwa Yol Jung, who cites the above text, comments on this as follows: 
µ+HJHO¶V ³WKHRUHWLFLVP´ DQG 0DU[¶V ³LGHRORJLVP´ DUH HTXDOO\ GRJPDWLF EHFDXVH WKH\
foreclose history as a movement, as an open future. The open-ended dialogics of difference 
IRVWHUWKHLGHDWKDWDPXOWLSOLFLW\RIGLIIHUHQFHVILQGVQRHQGLQJ¶85 He ends his chapter with 
WKHSURQRXQFHPHQWµ0LNKDLO%DNKWLQKDVFRPHRIDJHDVDVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOWKLQNHU¶86 
DQG VWUHVVHV µ7KH SLQQDFOH RI %DNKWLQ¶V KHWHURWRSLD RU GLDORJLFDO ERG\ SROLWLFV LV WKH
SULPDF\ RI WKH VLQJXODU 2WKHU LQ DOO UHODWLRQVKLSV « ,W LV WKLV KHWHURFHQWULF LGHD WKDW
prompts Hans-*HRUJH*DGDPHU«WRVD\WKDWWKHKHDUWRIGLDORJLFDOKHUPHQHXWLFVLVWKH
possibility that WKH2WKHUPLJKWEHULJKW¶87 Where liberalism and Marxism as the two great 
political organising principles of our age may have exhausted some of their potential to 
provide intelligibility to our world, let alone to achieve genuinely emancipatory and critical 
projectsGLDORJLVPHPHUJHVDVDQHZµLVP¶ZLWKFUHDWLYHVFRSHWRJHQHUDWHLGHDVDERXWWKH
substance of political community encompassing heteronomous political subjectivities and 
VRYHUHLJQWLHV ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WKH FKDOOHQJH SRVHG E\ /LQNODWHU WR µWUDQVIorm political 
FRPPXQLW\¶FDQEHDGGUHVVHGE\WKHµWKLFN¶SUDFWLFHVRISROLWLFDOGLDORJLVP 
All of this has specific resonance and import for Russia. Aileen Kelly argues that 
%DNKWLQLVµUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIDWHQXRXVEXWUREXVWVWUDQGRIDQWL-ideological thought which 
has survived in Russia from the early nineteenth century through all of the twentieth 
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century and has much potential for the twenty-ILUVW¶88 Her other exemplary representatives 
of this strain are Alexander Herzen and Anton Chekhov. She notes BakhWLQ¶VFRQFHUQZLWK
SUDFWLFDO HWKLFV DQG KLV EHOLHI WKDW µKXPDQ EHLQJV FRXOG EH PRUDOO\ FRKHUHQW DQG
maximally creative only if they learned to live without the traditional props of faith in 
DEVROXWHVDQGILQDOFHUWDLQWLHV¶DYLHZWKDW LV LQGHHGDWRGGVZith ideologically-informed 
D[LRORJLFDOWHQHWV)RUKLPµWKHVHOILVLQWULQVLFDOO\GLDORJLFDOLWVYLDELOLW\GHSHQGVRQWKH
TXDOLW\RI LWV UHVSRQVHV WR LWVHQYLURQPHQW¶89 $VKHZURWH µ7KHGLDORJLFDO QDWXUHRIRXU
relationship with an evolving environment invalidates the notion of fixed and final 
WUXWKV¶90 The dialogic context, moreover has no limits, and can thus be applied as much to 
politics as to cultural production. There is also a clear politics of resistance inherent in 
%DNKWLQ¶VDUJXPHQWµ2IILFLDOPRQRORJLVP¶ZLWKLWVµFODLPWRSRVVHVVLRQRIDUHDG\-made 
truth has been subverted throughout history by a carnival sense of the world: a grasp of the 
primal realities of existence ± birth, decay, metamorphosis, rebirth, and the impermanence 
of all human VWUXFWXUHV DQG SRZHUV¶91 This was an incendiary approach in the Soviet 
context, but the appeal to a dialogical selfhood is no less subversive today, not only 
because of its inherently emancipatory character but also because it provides the 
framework for a politics of critique that expands the very framework of politics. 
 In particular, in his early study of 1919-21, only published in 1986 with the title of 
Towards a Philosophy of the Act, treating the phenomenology of the individual event and 
drawing on the same well-VSULQJ DV +HU]HQ¶V PRVW LQVSLUHG SKLORVRSK\ %DNKWLQ VWXGLHG
µWKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK WHOHRORJLFDO V\VWHPV DQG GRFWULQHV RI SURJUHVV GLVWRUW WKH UHDOLW\ RI
KXPDQ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH KLVWRULFDO SURFHVV DQG WKH QDWXUH RI PRUDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶92 
Bakhtin DJUHHGZLWK+HU]HQWKDWLWZDVEHVWQRWWRVSHDNRIµVHWWOHGPRUDOQRUPVRUV\VWHPV
but of moral creativity ± LQ%DNKWLQ¶VZRUGV³WKHSURFHVVRIFUHDWLQJWKHHWKLFDOGHHG´KLV
WHUPIRUWKLVLV³DUFKLWHFWURQLFV´± the shaping of a relationship between the individual and 
KLVRUKHUFRQVWDQWO\FKDQJLQJQDWXUDODQGFXOWXUDOHQYLURQPHQW¶93 In other words, there is 
not only an open-endedness to historical outcomes, but there is a constant negotiation 
between the self and society in the creation of moral norms. This does not entail a vulgar 
relativism, since this is constituted within an ethics of responsibility and engagement. 
Neither does it mean alienation from a larger whole, but separation in this framework is not 
alienation but what Bakhtin called alterity (GUXJRVW¶ 2YHUDOO WKLV µHPSKDVLV RQ WKH
unfinalizability of history and human beings stood in radical opposition to the dominant 
eschatological tendency of Russian thought which looked to some formula ± whether 
sobornost or socialism ± for a final resolution of all conflicts between essence and 
H[LVWHQFHWKHSDUWDQGWKHZKROH¶94 This is a vision of society based, as one critic put it, on 
µWKHDQFLHQWLGHDRIWKHKDUPRQLRXVZKROHQHVVRIWKH&RVPRVZKLFKDSSURDFKWKHZRUOGDV
³WKH UHFLSURFDO VXSSOHPHQWDULW\ RI XQUHSHDWDEOH LQGLYLGXDOLWLHV´¶95 This again stands in 
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contrast to the teleological assumptions embedded in the taxis of much of the post-
communist transitological literature, as well as being inherent in the politics of post-Cold 
War enlargement .  
 
Instead of a conclusion 
 
Exploration of the distinction between axiological and dialogical politics in the context of 
*LUDUG¶V PLPHWLF WKHRU\ allows a more nuanced understanding of political processes 
today, at both the domestic and international level. First, the distinction between forms of 
rule, the forma imperii, and the mode of rule, forma regiminis, notably in the examination 
of the quality of democracy and the practices of international politics, allows us to 
identify one of the most salient features of contemporary domestic and international 
politics, namely the intensification of axiological politics. It alerts us to the problem that 
the culture of politics is as important as the formal institutional framework. Even the 
PRVW µGHPRFUDWLF¶ RU µOLEHUDO¶ JRYHUQPHQW RU RSSRVLWLRQ PRYHPHQW FDQ HQJDJH LQ
axiological politics, while an ostensibly authoritarian constitution can be managed in a 
relatively dialogical manner. The quality of democracy is as important as its forms. 
Second, opposition to an authoritarian order is not in and of itself normatively able to 
transcend axiological tropes. The Leninist wing of the Bolsheviks is perhaps the best 
example of this, which applied axiological politics in both opposition and power in 
extreme forms. In an inverted form, the post-&ROG :DU µWUDQVLWLRQV¶ UHSUHVHQWHG D QHZ
form of the politics of immanence, generating new forms of post-political axiology. We 
thus encounter the greatest paradox of all. The sort of dialectical politics that 
characterised the Soviet Union for seventy years has migrated to the West, and is now 
advanced in the service of the axiological expansion of an existing order. By contrast, the 
dialogical potential of politics is now advanced at the international level by Russia. There 
are deep Russian roots to political dialogism, and offers the potential not only to 
transform international affairs but the domestic polity as well. The seat of dialectical 
thinking has moved from Russia to the West, while in Russia the potential for dialogic 
thinking is being recovered. Third, the axiological style of politics lies at the heart of 
mimetic relationships. Within states the NDWƝFKRQ suppresses but does not resolve the 
mimetic crisis; while in relations between states the absence of a NDWƝFKRQ allows mimetic 
rivalry to proliferate. These take a variety of axiological forms, provoking the new cold war 
of today. Dialogical politics offers the possibility of resolving the crisis of mimetic rivalry, 
not by sacrificing the scapegoat but by opening up the positive potential of mimesis by 
bringing the putative scapegoat into the folds of a dialogical relationship. 
